»Vote Yes for a Safe Italy« or »Vote No to Defend the Constitution«: Italian Constitutional Politics between Majoritarianism and Civil Resistance

In the run-up to the constitutional referendum in October, the Italian government meets considerable resistance towards its plans for a comprehensive reform of the Constitution of 1948. Both Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and Constitutional Reform Minister Maria Elena Boschi regularly sustain that in case of a ‘No’ vote, chaos will rule. Public debate seems trapped in a Manichean game between yes-proponents that accuse the opposition of conservatism, and no-proponents that accuse the government of authoritarian leanings.

In the shadow of sovereign debt conditionality: the rise of spending conditionality in the EU

For the last seven years, sovereign debt conditionality dominated the European public discourse. Courts called to adjudicate heavy conditions impeaching on constitutional core of EU nations. National parliaments vocally debating the democratic legitimacy of austerity measures. Executives busy implementing generous reform packages. Scholars actively commenting on the constitutional implications of crisis-driven conditionalities.

Chronos and Kairos of Constitutionalism – The Polish case

Τοῖς πᾶσι χρόνος καὶ καιρὸς τῷ παντὶ πράγματι ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν. This Septuagint translation of a verse from the book of Ecclesiastes points to a fundamental distinction regarding the transience – the distinction between chronos (time) and kairos (a right moment). Time is everlasting and consists of singular kairoi. Kairos, being its constitutive part, should not defy the structure of time. This distinction bares on the way in which we should understand any change of a constitution that claims to belong to free and equal citizens.

The constitutional framework of power distribution within the Eurasian integration process: bellum omnium contra omnes

After the fall of the Soviet Union, many post-Soviet countries pursued integration among themselves, leading to various regional arrangements. Those had little success for an array of reasons stemming from considerable differences among the many integrating states. Eventually, an understanding came along, that in order to make things work, a change in approach is needed. Among others, such a change would require an efficient legal framework and stronger regional institutions capable of upholding it. These features were played with on the way to the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was obviously inspired by certain narratives about the EU integration process, and eventually launched in 2015.

Ultra-vires-Kontrolle durch Bundesregierung und Bundestag – Für eine materielle Subsidiarität des Vorgehens gegen das Parlament

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mit seinem Urteil zum OMT-Programm der Europäischen Zentralbank seiner Verantwortung, das (Verfassungs-)Recht in seinem größeren Bezug zu interpretieren (Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG), gerecht geworden. Die Bundesregierung und der Bundestag werden dabei aber in die Rolle von Rechtshütern gedrängt, die sie funktional und institutionell-gewaltenteilig nur schwer spielen können. Dies gilt vor allem für das Parlament.

Transformation of EU Constitutionalism

The EU constitutionalism has been transformed. For the worse. The causes for that are well known. They are the sum of consecutive, unresolved financial, economic, political, humanitarian and security crises. This post is not interested into causal relationship between the crises. It centers instead on their aggregate negative outcome and the possible way ahead. It asks what exactly the EU constitutionalism, as a dominant narrative of European integration, has (d)evolved into and what can be done to fix its fissures?

Polish Judiciary and Constitutional Fidelity: beyond the institutional »Great Yes«?

The Polish Supreme Court and the Polish Supreme Administrative Court both have published resolutions to back the Constitutional Court in its conflict with the ruling PiS majority in Parliament. The statements from Poland's highest courts and the societal mobilization are first symptoms of a constitutional fidelity in the making.