The East German Gap
Reflecting on guiding principles and content, history and practice.
Thema: Vergleichendes Verfassungsrecht
Rechtsvergleichende Verfassungsanalyse, Verfassungstransplantate und vergleichende Verfassungsrechtsprechung. Systematischer Vergleich von Verfassungssystemen, verfassungsrechtlichen Gestaltungsentscheidungen und Verfassungslösungen über verschiedene Rechtstraditionen und politische Systeme hinweg.
Leerstelle Ostdeutschland
Nachdenken über Leitideen und Inhalte, Geschichte und Praxis.
Unconstitutionality à l’Anglaise
After long and tortuous proceedings in Parliament, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 finally received Royal Assent on Thursday 25 April. There are so many problems with the Act and they are so fundamental that there has been speculation that the courts might refuse to apply some of the Act’s provisions. In this blogpost, I suggest that aside from the ‘hard-line’ approach of striking down or disapplying the statute in whole or in part, the courts also have a ‘soft-line’ option of declaring its unconstitutionality without denying its status as binding law. I explain how such an intervention might fit into the constitutional tradition of the UK and what may make it attractive in the case at hand.
India’s New Constitutional Climate Right
The Supreme Court of India delivered a historic judgement on climate change and human rights in M.K. Ranjitsinh and Others v. Union of India and Others (hereinafter “M.K. Ranjitsinh”) on March 21, 2024. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice, D.Y. Chandrachud, formulated a new constitutional right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change by drawing upon Article 21 (the fundamental right to life and personal liberty) and Article 14 (the fundamental right to equality) of the Indian Constitution. The final judgement is a remarkable development for the evolution of constitutional climate litigation in India
The End of a Dream?
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may have officially declared war on the hijab in 2022, but the Hindu right’s battle strategy has been set in place since at least 2014 when the BJP rose to power under the leadership of Narendra Modi. A tenacious master of populism, the BJP has successfully altered the mainstream Hindu perception of the Muslim as a threat to secularism. Within this imaginary, Muslims are believed to constantly seek exemptions from the secular regulations constraining the Hindu community.
Hercules or Sisyphus? On the legacy of statutory lawlessness in post-autocratic Poland
A constitutional responsibility.
The Digital Public Square meets the Digital Baton
The value a society and its laws place on protecting free speech is arguably most keenly felt where that speech takes a critical turn. Which is why the history of this field is littered with prosecutions and penalties being levied against problematic speech, inviting courts to draw the lines between what is protected and what is not. The past ten years in India demonstrate that when faced with speech that is critical of government policy or state action, the state has become increasingly hesitant to let it remain on air. What is perhaps most alarming for the health of democracy is that, in most cases, there is often a synergy across the three arms of the State that curbing problematic speech is the best course of action to follow.
Subordination and Arbitrariness in Citizenship Law
In 2019, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party returned to power in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party oversaw the enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (‘CAA’) which gave Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian (but not Muslim) migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan a fast-tracked pathway to Indian citizenship. This post argues that the CAA is unconstitutional, and uses it as an example to clarify two important under-theorised Indian constitutional principles: anti-subordination and arbitrariness.
Amending the Constitution Without Deliberation
India is undergoing a “deliberation backsliding”. Since the current government was elected to office in 2019, only 13% of all government bills introduced in Parliament were referred to Parliament Committees for detailed study, scrutiny and stakeholder consultations. While the deliberation deficit is concerning with respect to ordinary government bills, it becomes alarming with respect to bills which seek to amend the Indian Constitution. In this blog post, I argue that the promise of deliberative democracy in India is coming undone, which sets back the project of constitutionalism in India.
Reimagining Indian Federalism
As India’s new dominant party system coalesced after 2014, the country entered a phase of centralisation. India has always had federalism with a strong centre, but from the late 1980s to the mid-2010s, political and economic regionalism and national coalition governments encompassing national and regional parties produced an appearance of deepening federalisation. Since 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) became the first party in over 25 years to win an outright parliamentary majority, the twin pillars of political centralisation under a dominant party system and economic concentration, have once again drawn attention to the contested nature of India’s federal contract.
