Corona Constitutional #46: Diktatoren haben es auch nicht immer leicht

In Belarus kämpft Alexander Lukaschenka mit ungezügelter Brutalität um seine Macht. Und ob es ihm gelingt, sie zu behalten, davon hängt auch für den russischen Präsidenten Vladimir Putin ungeheuer viel ab. Im gleichen Moment wird Putins schärfster Kritiker Alexei Navalny mit einer akuten Vergiftung ins Krankenhaus eingeliefert und dann nach Deutschland ausgeflogen. Wie hängt das zusammen? Ist der Anschlag ein Zeichen von Stärke oder von Schwäche? Diese Fragen diskutiert Max Steinbeis mit der Politikwissenschaftlerin und Russland-Expertin Silvia von Steinsdorff von der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

The Africanization of International Investment Disputes – from Past to Present

The depiction of Third World resistance to investor-state dispute settlement as a homogeneous one is an oversimplification. While the plurality of Third World Approaches to International Law scholarship is emphasized by its name (“Approaches”), descriptions such as ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’ tend to leave room for generalization and simplification. Such a simplification may easily discourage flows of much needed capital into African states. I will show that African states have been rather instrumental in shaping today’s ISDS regime and outline an African approach to international investment law.

›All nations must be considered to be civilized‹

Even though Art. 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute is supposed to remain the starting point for the identification of general principles of international law, Special Rapporteur Vázquez-Bermúdez suggests avoiding the reference to ‘civilized nations’. Getting rid of the explicit reference to the standard of civilization remains merely cosmetic as long as international sources doctrine does not simultaneously reflect the persisting influence of colonial ideas. Decolonizing international sources doctrine requires remedying Eurocentrist conceptions of what constitutes ‘the principal legal systems of the world’ and understanding the role of the idea of a legal system in the standard of civilization.

One day (Vandaag) …

Yes I do ... have a migration background. Yet, due to mere genetic randomness, my “Germanness” has hardly ever been challenged – at least until the moment when it comes to the correct spelling of my family name: “KHan” not “KaHn” – Dschinghis, not Oliver – please! Occasionally, I still get carried away with coquetting in my lectures: “I would be inclined to say – I am a case of successful integration.” Some students may then be slightly embarrassed, in particular after a controversial discussion about immigration policy. But that’s it basically, my personal home story about “racism”! But to be very clear and unambiguous: my father’s story is a much longer and a much more painful one! But that’s another story.

The Chinese threat we forgot about: Huawei and ISDS

During the era of coronavirus emergency, the words China and threat tend to suggest the origin of our common affliction. The world to emerge from coronavirus however will face both new challenges and the echo of old ones. An old problem is what to do about Chinese involvement in 5G infrastructure development. In light of the recent ban for Huawei equipment by the UK this post addresses the question of whether the Chinese multinational Huawei would have an investment claim against the German government were they to prohibit its participation in 5G deployment.

Farewell to the European Constitutional Tradition

On 1 July 2020, with Russia’s coronavirus cases passing 650,000 and following an elaborate spectacle of public affirmation, the Russian electorate eventually confirmed the constitutional amendments. First proposed by Russian president Vladimir Putin in January, the 2020 Russian Constitutional Amendments were initially planned to enter into force only three months later upon approval in an ‘all-Russian vote’ scheduled for 22 April 2020 but had to be postponed due to the spread of the coronavirus. Although many of these amendments have to be considered mainly symbolic, they constitute the most fundamental changes of Russia’s Constitution in its 26-year history.

Loyalty vs. Sovereignty

The German Constitutional Court’s Weiss ruling has led to a major debate as to whether a national supreme court may disregard ECJ case law, asserting that the ECJ had acted ultra vires. Similar debates have existed for quite some time in the EFTA pillar of the EEA, consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. A relatively small but powerful group of lawyers in the Norwegian administration (led by the Government Attorney), orthodox dualist professors and judges loyal to the government has used Norway’s dominant position to attempt to redefine EEA law. One of the most effective strategies is the suppression of the notion of loyalty or good faith and its replacement by a strategy of creating “room for manoeuvre” (“RFM”) for Norway.

Investment Law in Corona Times: How Myths Fuel Injustice

One of the leitmotivs of the discourse around the pandemic is that ‘there cannot be going back to business as usual’ (see here and here). Yet, it is business as usual that is alarmingly looming in Corona times. In this context, at least two developments are worthy of note: the first is the much discussed risk of a wave of Covid-related investment claims. The second, possibly less noticed, is that countries are silently expanding the scope of a system that does not adequately strengthen sustainability in economic relations, despite laconic initiatives to this purpose.

The French Loi de Vigilance: Prospects and Limitations of a Pioneer Mandatory Corporate Due Diligence

The French Loi de Vigilance is the result of a remarkable mobilization of trade unions, civil society and parliamentarians. It combines hard law with (international) soft law standards on business and human rights and introduces an unprecedented corporate duty of vigilance in French tort law.